What to do about North Korea?

Posted by Professor John Conybeare

 

For weeks North Korea (NK) has been escalating its rhetoric of nuclear threats, but the world responds with mockery.  Even in China, blogs refer to Kim Jong Un as “King Fatty the 3^rd.”  Yet we do not mock Iran, and take its nuclear ambitions far more seriously than we do NK’s threats to use the nuclear weapons it already has.  The US has even threatened war to prevent Iran acquiring the capabilities that NK currently possesses; and Professor Lai’s recent posting on this blog notes that Americans are more willing to accept the use of force against Iran than they are with respect to NK. Why the different views?  One difference is that NK’s threats are almost exclusively directed against the US, threats that we know NK is currently not capable of carrying out (e.g., turning Colorado Springs into a “sea of fire”).  Iran does not make such threats against the US, and indeed claims it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons.  We dismiss NK leaders as clownish purveyors of “cheap talk,” but when Iran does make threats (such as in response to a hypothetical Israeli attack), we take such threats very seriously.  Aside from NK’s inability to attack the US mainland (US bases in Asia are another matter), we assume China could and will restrain NK from instigating any action that would result in prolonged military hostilities.  Pretending to be “irrational” can bring some bargaining advantages, but only if you do not employ the tactic too often, as it depreciates rapidly.  NK leaders have used the tactic so frequently that it actually reduces their credibility and makes them objects of ridicule.

This crisis will end, like all the others.  NK will claim that a US invasion has been deterred, and life will go back to normal.  Yet NK is unlikely to get what it wants: one-on-one talks with the US as an “equal” (i.e., outside of the established five power framework of talks, the only forum within which the US says it will talk to NK) and a resumption of food aid.  Sooner or later, the NK leadership will feel compelled, for reasons of resource shortage or internal faction fighting, to start another confrontation with the claim that the US is (again!) about to attack NK.  It will once again demand “respect” and bribes.  Is there another path for the powers that must deal with NK, other than sighing and rolling the eyes?  Perhaps.

Although NK leaders are undoubtedly motivated primarily by the desire to remain in power, the claim of an imminent US attack is the public rationale for their periodic eruptions into blistering threats.  Why not just withdraw all US forces from South Korea?   Why are they still there six decades after the Korean War?   The South Korean (SK) military is perfectly capable of defending SK against a ground invasion by NK, and of responding to lesser conventional incursions.  What does the US military presence add? A nuclear retaliatory threat?  If that is the case, the US could carry out nuclear (and some conventional) retaliation without any deployment of forces within SK.  The functions served by US forces in SK are to provide NK with an excuse to have its tantrums, China an excuse to continue to keep the regime alive with resources, and a guarantee of US casualties if war breaks out (does SK distrust the US so much that it needs this assurance?).  Some observers believe that US forces are really in SK to contain China, a plausible conjecture, though it is unclear how US forces in SK could do this in the event of, for example, a China-Japan conflict over ocean resources.

Here is a proposal: the US should withdraw all of its forces from SK, and Secretary of State Kerry should negotiate an agreement with China whereby they would jointly guarantee NK and SK from invasion by the other.  Although there could be reliability issues in such an agreement (would China intervene to stop NK if it attacked SK?), it should be possible to frame an agreement that would work to assure both halves of Korea that their borders are secure.  Deprived of its claim of a US invasion threat, what would NK do? Would it escalate threats against SK, or Japan, or China, claiming they are acting on behalf of the US?  Such threats would lack credibility. NK is like a honey bee: it knows that it can sting once, and then it would die.  Its leaders do not appear to have a martyr syndrome, and despite their habitual “brinkmanship” tactics, they are not irrational.  The person who accosts you in the street, points a gun at his head and threatens to kill himself if he does not get a payment, is unlikely to get the outcome he desires.  Perhaps NK would then quietly go the way of East Germany, as its leaders discover that they are no longer able to hold the population in subjection with the rallying cry of a US attack.  Internal factions might become more politically important, some of these factions could perceive change to be in their long term interests, and the regime might crumble from within.  The ethnic homogeneity of Korea would make it hard for the regime to stay in power by pitting subsections of the population against each other, as is the case with Syria.

 

Diffusion and International Relations

Posted by Professor Sara Mitchell

I recently returned from the annual convention of the International Studies Association (http://www.isanet.org/) in San Francisco which had close to 1,100 panels and roundtables and about 6,000 participants from 60+ countries. The theme of the conference was “The Politics of International Diffusion: Regional and Global Dimensions.” I participated in one roundtable related to the theme on the diffusion of liberalism and I also participated in an innovative roundtable linking theories of international relations and foreign policy. Both roundtables got me thinking about the conference’s focus on the processes of diffusion.

 

As a Kantian peace scholar, I have long been interested in the increasing number of democratic countries globally and the implications of this growing democratic community for world politics. One obvious benefit is the potential for increased peace, as fully democratic countries do not go to war with other fully democratic countries. The benefits extend to lower level crises or diplomatic conflicts, as militarized disputes between democratic countries rarely involve any fatalities.  My own work also shows a similar pattern at the systemic level, as a higher proportion of democratic countries in the world reduces the proportion of countries fighting wars (Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999).  As I discussed on the liberalism roundtable, we can think about the current events in the Arab Spring as part of this broader dynamic process of the international system becoming more democratic.  The Kantian diffusion process has other potential benefits as well, with democracies generally having better human rights policies and respecting their neighbors’ land borders, removing one of the most contentious issues that often leads to war.  Democracies also create and join international organizations more frequently than their autocratic peers and these organizations have also been shown to serve as portals for the spread of Kantian values such as democracy and respect for human rights.
 
One question that arose was whether we are actually witnessing the diffusion of liberalism.  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (New York University) presented some data on global human rights, focusing on violations of personal integrity rights (e.g. torture or political imprisonment). His data suggested that there have not been any major changes in states’ human rights practices in the past 30+ years. This raises an interesting question about why improvements in human rights are lagging behind the growth of the democratic community.  A second question that Bueno de Mesquita raised was related to the idea of diffusion itself.  How do we know when processes actually diffuse across borders or groups? He argued that we can understand what looks like the diffusion of liberalism by focusing on leaders’ incentives to stay in power and the institutions inside the state that create various strategic incentives. I responded by saying that while I think domestic institutions help us understand a lot about interstate interactions, we cannot ignore diffusion processes at the global level.  For example, many democratic regimes get created in large clumps at points in history where something major happens such as a world war or the end of the Cold War.  We have seen major changes in states’ foreign policy practices following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. And many panels at ISA focused on how information and technology (e.g. twitter) are mechanisms for diffusion today.

For me, the best way to determine if there are diffusion processes is to find a group of actors that do not have the internal incentives or preferences to adopt a certain type of behavior, but do so regardless. In my own work (Mitchell 2002), that involved looking at whether non-democratic countries adopted certain types of behavior promoted by the democratic community, such as the use of third party adjudication or arbitration.  I found that pairs of states with non-democratic governments are sixteen times more likely to use third party conflict management strategies to settle border disputes when 50% of the countries in the world are democratic, versus a system where there are no democracies.  Thus a foreign policy decision such as taking a border dispute to an international court depends upon the systemic environment within which the decision is made.  While an emphasis on domestic institutions and leaders gives us valuable insight into understanding foreign policy behavior, we cannot lose sight of global or regional environments and how changes in these systems might influence states’ or leaders’ foreign policy decisions.  On the second roundtable I participated in, I came to precisely this conclusion, arguing that theories of foreign policy will always need theories of international relations. And theories of international relations must not lose sight of the broader international system and the global diffusion processes that are unfolding.

 

References

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. “A Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution.”

American Journal of Political Science, October, 46(4): 749-759.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Scott Gates, and Håvard Hegre. 1999. “Evolution in Democracy-War

Dynamics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(6): 771-792.

 

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Are you interested in a career in the Federal government? Do jobs in organizations such as the CIA, Department of Homeland Security, or the US Senate sound appealing to you? 

 

Get the inside scoop on how to get a job within the government when you join us for a one-hour program. We will be discussing best practices on planning and starting the job search, understanding the application process, and navigating the inner workings of USAjobs.gov. 

 

Session Information:

Tuesday, April 16 

4-5 p.m. In C230 PC

 

Please RSVP by April 12 to james-seyfer@uiowa.edu

 

For more information, visit www.careers.uiowa.edu 

 

 

US Public Opinion on Iran and North Korea

Posted by Associate Professor Brian Lai

                North Korea has recently made military threats against the US and South Korea and has claimed that it may restart a nuclear reactor, which would allow them to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The Permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany are meeting with Iran this first weekend of April to discuss its nuclear program and the current impasse over Iran’s desire to enrich uranium.

                The US is currently dealing with two states that either have or are thought to be developing nuclear weapons. North Korea and Iran have also had a history of poor relations with the United States. Given the importance of addressing the issues presented by North Korea and Iran, how does the US public feel about both of these crises?

                The Chicago Council on Global Affairs does a survey of American foreign policy attitudes every two years. Looking at the results from the 2012 survey, can shed some light on how Americans would like to proceed with both countries.

                First, as displayed in the graph below, most Americans in this survey (64%) identify Iran’s nuclear program as a Critical Threat.

                Borrowing a Figure from the CCGA report, most Americans favor the UN using economic sanctions or diplomacy as opposed to the use of force, though force through the UN Security Council still receives about 45% support.

                Military action receives more support when asked “In your opinion, which is more important: to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even if it means taking military action, OR to avoid a military conflict with Iran, even if it means they may develop nuclear weapons?” This question was asked by the Pew Research Center during March 13-17,2013. 64% choose Prevent Iran from Developing a nuclear weapon while only 25% said Avoid Military Conflict.

                Turning back to the CCGA study, it looks like force has more support if it is authorized by the UN. 70% of Americans in this survey responded that the US should not use a military strike if it is not authorized by the UN Security Council.    

                Finally, a slim majority of Americans in this survey (52% to 45%) indicated that they would allow Iran to produce nuclear fuel for electricity if UN inspectors were allowed permanent and full access throughout Iran.

                In terms of Iran’s nuclear policy, it is clear that most Americans  view this as an important issue and would prefer a non-military solution, but depending on how the question is presented, slightly under 50% to a solid majority would support military force if it prevented Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

North Korea

                In a recent CNN/ORC poll (March 15-17, 2013), 28% of respondents identified North Korea as an immediate threat, while 53% indicated it was a long term threat and 17% said no threat at all.

                In the 2012 CCGA survey, respondents were asked, “In America’s relations with South Korea, how high a priority should the US place on each of the following:” The graph below shows the responses for “Preventing North Korea from building its nuclear capability”

In terms of how to deal with a nuclear North Korea, most Americans favor a diplomatic approach with military options receiving no more than 37% support (This Figure again is from the CCGA report)

Americans are concerned about Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs though it appears that more Americans are willing to use force in Iran than in North Korea.