What to do about North Korea?

Posted by Professor John Conybeare

 

For weeks North Korea (NK) has been escalating its rhetoric of nuclear threats, but the world responds with mockery.  Even in China, blogs refer to Kim Jong Un as “King Fatty the 3^rd.”  Yet we do not mock Iran, and take its nuclear ambitions far more seriously than we do NK’s threats to use the nuclear weapons it already has.  The US has even threatened war to prevent Iran acquiring the capabilities that NK currently possesses; and Professor Lai’s recent posting on this blog notes that Americans are more willing to accept the use of force against Iran than they are with respect to NK. Why the different views?  One difference is that NK’s threats are almost exclusively directed against the US, threats that we know NK is currently not capable of carrying out (e.g., turning Colorado Springs into a “sea of fire”).  Iran does not make such threats against the US, and indeed claims it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons.  We dismiss NK leaders as clownish purveyors of “cheap talk,” but when Iran does make threats (such as in response to a hypothetical Israeli attack), we take such threats very seriously.  Aside from NK’s inability to attack the US mainland (US bases in Asia are another matter), we assume China could and will restrain NK from instigating any action that would result in prolonged military hostilities.  Pretending to be “irrational” can bring some bargaining advantages, but only if you do not employ the tactic too often, as it depreciates rapidly.  NK leaders have used the tactic so frequently that it actually reduces their credibility and makes them objects of ridicule.

This crisis will end, like all the others.  NK will claim that a US invasion has been deterred, and life will go back to normal.  Yet NK is unlikely to get what it wants: one-on-one talks with the US as an “equal” (i.e., outside of the established five power framework of talks, the only forum within which the US says it will talk to NK) and a resumption of food aid.  Sooner or later, the NK leadership will feel compelled, for reasons of resource shortage or internal faction fighting, to start another confrontation with the claim that the US is (again!) about to attack NK.  It will once again demand “respect” and bribes.  Is there another path for the powers that must deal with NK, other than sighing and rolling the eyes?  Perhaps.

Although NK leaders are undoubtedly motivated primarily by the desire to remain in power, the claim of an imminent US attack is the public rationale for their periodic eruptions into blistering threats.  Why not just withdraw all US forces from South Korea?   Why are they still there six decades after the Korean War?   The South Korean (SK) military is perfectly capable of defending SK against a ground invasion by NK, and of responding to lesser conventional incursions.  What does the US military presence add? A nuclear retaliatory threat?  If that is the case, the US could carry out nuclear (and some conventional) retaliation without any deployment of forces within SK.  The functions served by US forces in SK are to provide NK with an excuse to have its tantrums, China an excuse to continue to keep the regime alive with resources, and a guarantee of US casualties if war breaks out (does SK distrust the US so much that it needs this assurance?).  Some observers believe that US forces are really in SK to contain China, a plausible conjecture, though it is unclear how US forces in SK could do this in the event of, for example, a China-Japan conflict over ocean resources.

Here is a proposal: the US should withdraw all of its forces from SK, and Secretary of State Kerry should negotiate an agreement with China whereby they would jointly guarantee NK and SK from invasion by the other.  Although there could be reliability issues in such an agreement (would China intervene to stop NK if it attacked SK?), it should be possible to frame an agreement that would work to assure both halves of Korea that their borders are secure.  Deprived of its claim of a US invasion threat, what would NK do? Would it escalate threats against SK, or Japan, or China, claiming they are acting on behalf of the US?  Such threats would lack credibility. NK is like a honey bee: it knows that it can sting once, and then it would die.  Its leaders do not appear to have a martyr syndrome, and despite their habitual “brinkmanship” tactics, they are not irrational.  The person who accosts you in the street, points a gun at his head and threatens to kill himself if he does not get a payment, is unlikely to get the outcome he desires.  Perhaps NK would then quietly go the way of East Germany, as its leaders discover that they are no longer able to hold the population in subjection with the rallying cry of a US attack.  Internal factions might become more politically important, some of these factions could perceive change to be in their long term interests, and the regime might crumble from within.  The ethnic homogeneity of Korea would make it hard for the regime to stay in power by pitting subsections of the population against each other, as is the case with Syria.

 

Diffusion and International Relations

Posted by Professor Sara Mitchell

I recently returned from the annual convention of the International Studies Association (http://www.isanet.org/) in San Francisco which had close to 1,100 panels and roundtables and about 6,000 participants from 60+ countries. The theme of the conference was “The Politics of International Diffusion: Regional and Global Dimensions.” I participated in one roundtable related to the theme on the diffusion of liberalism and I also participated in an innovative roundtable linking theories of international relations and foreign policy. Both roundtables got me thinking about the conference’s focus on the processes of diffusion.

 

As a Kantian peace scholar, I have long been interested in the increasing number of democratic countries globally and the implications of this growing democratic community for world politics. One obvious benefit is the potential for increased peace, as fully democratic countries do not go to war with other fully democratic countries. The benefits extend to lower level crises or diplomatic conflicts, as militarized disputes between democratic countries rarely involve any fatalities.  My own work also shows a similar pattern at the systemic level, as a higher proportion of democratic countries in the world reduces the proportion of countries fighting wars (Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999).  As I discussed on the liberalism roundtable, we can think about the current events in the Arab Spring as part of this broader dynamic process of the international system becoming more democratic.  The Kantian diffusion process has other potential benefits as well, with democracies generally having better human rights policies and respecting their neighbors’ land borders, removing one of the most contentious issues that often leads to war.  Democracies also create and join international organizations more frequently than their autocratic peers and these organizations have also been shown to serve as portals for the spread of Kantian values such as democracy and respect for human rights.
 
One question that arose was whether we are actually witnessing the diffusion of liberalism.  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (New York University) presented some data on global human rights, focusing on violations of personal integrity rights (e.g. torture or political imprisonment). His data suggested that there have not been any major changes in states’ human rights practices in the past 30+ years. This raises an interesting question about why improvements in human rights are lagging behind the growth of the democratic community.  A second question that Bueno de Mesquita raised was related to the idea of diffusion itself.  How do we know when processes actually diffuse across borders or groups? He argued that we can understand what looks like the diffusion of liberalism by focusing on leaders’ incentives to stay in power and the institutions inside the state that create various strategic incentives. I responded by saying that while I think domestic institutions help us understand a lot about interstate interactions, we cannot ignore diffusion processes at the global level.  For example, many democratic regimes get created in large clumps at points in history where something major happens such as a world war or the end of the Cold War.  We have seen major changes in states’ foreign policy practices following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. And many panels at ISA focused on how information and technology (e.g. twitter) are mechanisms for diffusion today.

For me, the best way to determine if there are diffusion processes is to find a group of actors that do not have the internal incentives or preferences to adopt a certain type of behavior, but do so regardless. In my own work (Mitchell 2002), that involved looking at whether non-democratic countries adopted certain types of behavior promoted by the democratic community, such as the use of third party adjudication or arbitration.  I found that pairs of states with non-democratic governments are sixteen times more likely to use third party conflict management strategies to settle border disputes when 50% of the countries in the world are democratic, versus a system where there are no democracies.  Thus a foreign policy decision such as taking a border dispute to an international court depends upon the systemic environment within which the decision is made.  While an emphasis on domestic institutions and leaders gives us valuable insight into understanding foreign policy behavior, we cannot lose sight of global or regional environments and how changes in these systems might influence states’ or leaders’ foreign policy decisions.  On the second roundtable I participated in, I came to precisely this conclusion, arguing that theories of foreign policy will always need theories of international relations. And theories of international relations must not lose sight of the broader international system and the global diffusion processes that are unfolding.

 

References

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. “A Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution.”

American Journal of Political Science, October, 46(4): 749-759.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Scott Gates, and Håvard Hegre. 1999. “Evolution in Democracy-War

Dynamics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(6): 771-792.

 

Pursuing Jobs with the Government

Are you interested in a career in the Federal government? Do jobs in organizations such as the CIA, Department of Homeland Security, or the US Senate sound appealing to you? 

 

Get the inside scoop on how to get a job within the government when you join us for a one-hour program. We will be discussing best practices on planning and starting the job search, understanding the application process, and navigating the inner workings of USAjobs.gov. 

 

Session Information:

Tuesday, April 16 

4-5 p.m. In C230 PC

 

Please RSVP by April 12 to james-seyfer@uiowa.edu

 

For more information, visit www.careers.uiowa.edu 

 

 

US Public Opinion on Iran and North Korea

Posted by Associate Professor Brian Lai

                North Korea has recently made military threats against the US and South Korea and has claimed that it may restart a nuclear reactor, which would allow them to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The Permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany are meeting with Iran this first weekend of April to discuss its nuclear program and the current impasse over Iran’s desire to enrich uranium.

                The US is currently dealing with two states that either have or are thought to be developing nuclear weapons. North Korea and Iran have also had a history of poor relations with the United States. Given the importance of addressing the issues presented by North Korea and Iran, how does the US public feel about both of these crises?

                The Chicago Council on Global Affairs does a survey of American foreign policy attitudes every two years. Looking at the results from the 2012 survey, can shed some light on how Americans would like to proceed with both countries.

                First, as displayed in the graph below, most Americans in this survey (64%) identify Iran’s nuclear program as a Critical Threat.

                Borrowing a Figure from the CCGA report, most Americans favor the UN using economic sanctions or diplomacy as opposed to the use of force, though force through the UN Security Council still receives about 45% support.

                Military action receives more support when asked “In your opinion, which is more important: to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even if it means taking military action, OR to avoid a military conflict with Iran, even if it means they may develop nuclear weapons?” This question was asked by the Pew Research Center during March 13-17,2013. 64% choose Prevent Iran from Developing a nuclear weapon while only 25% said Avoid Military Conflict.

                Turning back to the CCGA study, it looks like force has more support if it is authorized by the UN. 70% of Americans in this survey responded that the US should not use a military strike if it is not authorized by the UN Security Council.    

                Finally, a slim majority of Americans in this survey (52% to 45%) indicated that they would allow Iran to produce nuclear fuel for electricity if UN inspectors were allowed permanent and full access throughout Iran.

                In terms of Iran’s nuclear policy, it is clear that most Americans  view this as an important issue and would prefer a non-military solution, but depending on how the question is presented, slightly under 50% to a solid majority would support military force if it prevented Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

North Korea

                In a recent CNN/ORC poll (March 15-17, 2013), 28% of respondents identified North Korea as an immediate threat, while 53% indicated it was a long term threat and 17% said no threat at all.

                In the 2012 CCGA survey, respondents were asked, “In America’s relations with South Korea, how high a priority should the US place on each of the following:” The graph below shows the responses for “Preventing North Korea from building its nuclear capability”

In terms of how to deal with a nuclear North Korea, most Americans favor a diplomatic approach with military options receiving no more than 37% support (This Figure again is from the CCGA report)

Americans are concerned about Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs though it appears that more Americans are willing to use force in Iran than in North Korea.

All Atwitter: Global Communication in the Age of Social Media

All Atwitter: Global Communication in the Age of Social Media

Posted by the 30:180 Honors in Political Science Class
Think only the leaders of big countries have global followings on twitter? Think again.

People around the world are talking, and they’re talking about political leaders. The head of state of any given country is tweeted about in 16 different languages on average, according to a new study we conducted as University of Iowa students enrolled in Political Science Professor Bob Boynton’s Honors Seminar on the Study of Politics.

In order to analyze global communication, we collected tweets containing the name of the head of state of 12 different countries. Since twitter is global, anyone in the world can send out a message in their own native language. These tweets can be collected, catalogued, and identified by language using various online software. We used Quick Count, a site capable of capturing 1,500 twitter messages at a time containing a specified set of keywords.

We hypothesized that we would find evidence of global communication, since twitter use is not bound by geographic region. By “global communication” we mean, for example, finding Polish-speakers tweeting about United States President Barack Obama, and Spanish-speakers tweeting about United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron. As it turns out, they are.

Our initial hypothesis echoed the theories of Karl Deutsch, a 20th century American social and political scientist. Deutsch argued that as social communication increases, traditional boundaries separating countries will dissipate.

Our research found that communication is rapidly crossing geographic borders. Each head of state received between eight (Mario Monti, Italy) and 20 (Barack Obama, U.S.) unique language tweets over the span of three days.

And smaller countries aren’t left out of the loop. While we found a small positive correlation between the population size of a country and the number of different languages tweeted about the country’s head of state, smaller countries were still well represented in global communication. Taoiseach of Ireland (pop. 4,487,000) Edna Kenney was tweeted about in 15 different languages. Chancellor of Germany (pop. 81,726,000) Angela Merkel was tweeted about in 18 different languages. That’s a difference of only three languages, though Germany’s population is 20 times that of Ireland’s.

This semester, we will continue analyzing twitter’s role in global communication by studying messages, languages, demographics, and key global issues setting the twittersphere ablaze. Our goal is to better understand the extent to which Deutsch’s theories about social communication are applicable to social media today. For us, twitter is more than a social networking site. It’s a powerful tool which is enabling anyone with a computer or smart phone to participate in political dialogue.  Twitter’s ability to communicate between many languages simultaneously concerning a current political event will continue to influence politics across borders.

  

Institute of World Politics Internships

The Institute of World Politics (IWP) Internship Program seeks current undergraduate students and recent college grads with interests in international relations, statecraft, national security, and intelligence. IWP interns have the opportunity to research matters of national importance under scholar-practitioners in a professional setting by presenting strategic briefs or writing executive summaries and journal articles. Interns will attend lectures and seminars relevant to today’s most pressing strategic affairs, unofficially audit graduate-level courses free of charge and explore career opportunities with our career counselor.

 

Applications should be submitted by March 15^th, 2013.

 

Go to http://www.iwp.edu/programs/page/applying-for-an-iwp-internship

 

to apply. 

What’s the Matter with Cyprus?

Posted by Visiting Assistant Professor Bartholomew C. Watson

If you were to describe a Mediterranean country that is split in two, with one half that is more developed and tied closely to the West, the other half much poorer and largely Muslim, and both sides separated by barbed wire, the average American would likely think of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  However, this situation also describes another equally intractable, but less known conflict that is occurring on the island of Cyprus.

Cyprus has been contested for millennia for its strategic value in the Mediterranean, having been controlled by a series of empires including the Romans, the Byzantines, the Ottomans, and the British.  The island gained independence from the last of these rulers, the British, in 1960.  The joy of independence was short-lived, however, as sectarian violence between ethnic Greeks and Turks soon rocked the island.  As with other recent sectarian conflicts around the world, this violence quickly escalated, forcing residents of both sides out of their homes, and began re-shuffling the once integrated island into a northern Turkish region and a southern Greek region.

The conflict took on a new dimension in 1974, when an attempted coup by Greek Cypriot nationalists, who were intent on unifying the island with Greece, prompted an invasion by the Turkish military.  Although the fighting was brief, this conflict further divided the island, with tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots fleeing south and tens of thousands of Turks fleeing north.  After failed negotiations, a second Turkish offensive in 1974 resulted in a ceasefire that left 59% of the country controlled by Greek Cypriots, 36% by Turkish Cypriots, and the rest by a United Nations buffer zone and British Sovereign Base Areas, a legacy of British rule. 

These geographic divisions still exist today.  The country is divided into the Republic of Cyprus in the south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the north (which is not officially recognized by any country other than Turkey, including the United States).  Given this complicated and tragic history, what is the likelihood that Cyprus’s future will include a peaceful, diplomatic solution, and the end to the barbed-wire separation of the island’s population?

Several factors in recent years have complicated the negotiations process.  The first was the entry of the southern Republic of Cyprus into the European Union in 2004.  Many observers had hoped that the prospect of EU membership could be one tool to prompt Greek (and to a lesser extent Turkish) Cypriots to the negotiating table.  By gaining EU membership before a territorial settlement had been reached, this prospect was eliminated. (As a side note: Cyprus’s position as an EU member state is a major impediment to Turkish accession in the future.  See for instance: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-05/turkey-s-eu-bid-is-stalled-cyprus-to-blame-van-rompuy-says).

The second, more recent complication has been the worldwide financial crisis, which has been particularly harsh to the Republic of Cyprus.  Given the country’s close ties to Greece, Cypriot banks were heavily invested in Greek sovereign bonds, and are now in need of an EU bailout.  Consequently, economics has taken the forefront in recent political discourse, with the geo-political “Cyprus problem” taking a back seat.

Nevertheless, just this week there were some hopeful signs.  On Sunday, February 24, Cyprus elected a new Presidential candidate, Nicos Anastasiades (for more information, see The New York Times article on his election: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/world/europe/conservative-candidate-elected-president-in-cyprus.html).  Although banks and bailouts will certainly be Mr. Anastasiades’s first priority, he has long been in favor of a loose federal solution to the standoff known as the Annan Plan (the plan is named after former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan; a full version of the plan can be found at: http://unannanplan.agrino.org/Annan_Plan_MARCH_30_2004.pdf). 

The new President will have an uphill battle in implementing this plan.  A March 2004 referendum on the Annan plan saw Greek Cypriots reject it by a 3:1 margin (76% to 24%; a similar referendum among Turkish Cypriots was approved 65% to 35%).  However, a successful resolution to the country’s financial woes and economic troubles would present Mr. Anastasiades with a great deal of political capital, which could then be spent working toward a solution for a conflict that has persiste